Conflict of Laws -- Full Faith and Credit -- Res Judicata or Estoppel by Judgment by unknown
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
2-1-1953
Conflict of Laws -- Full Faith and Credit -- Res
Judicata or Estoppel by Judgment
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Conflict of Laws -- Full Faith and Credit -- Res Judicata or Estoppel by Judgment, 7 U. Miami L. Rev. 250 (1953)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol7/iss2/13
CASES NOTED
CONFLICT OF LAWS - FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
RES JUDICATA OR ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, after having his suit for divorce in Ohio on the grounds of
extreme cruelty and gross neglect of duty denied,' brought suit in Florida
on the grounds of extreme cruelty. 2 Held, where witnesses and testimony
are the same in both actions, the causes of action are the same, and the
test used in determining whether or not the decree of a sister state shall be
given full faith and credit is res judicata, rather than estoppel by judgment.
Riehl v. Riehl, 60 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1952).
The doctrine of res judicata prevents a cause of action which has
once been fairly litigated from ever being relitigated by the same parties or
their privies.3 The judgment is a bar forever to that cause of action, not
only as to the issues actually presented, but also to every justiciable issue
which might have been presented.4  However, res judicata does not pre-
clude the parties from litigating a different cause of action. The rule
seems clear that where a final judgment has been rendered, and a suit
is later brought by the same parties, but based upon a different cause of
action, estoppel by judgment rather than res judicata, is the proper doctrine
applicable5 in distinguishing whether the former suit is a bar to the second
action. This is a distinction of considerable importance, since estoppel by
judgment only operates to preclude the parties from relitigating matters
which were actually raised and determined in the former adjudication.0
1. Onso CoDE ANN. § 11979 (Gum. Supp. 1952).
2. FLA. STAT. § 65.04 (1951).
3. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); Williamson v, Columbia Gas
and Electric Corp., 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950); Lake Region Hotel Co. v. Gallick, Il
Fla. 64, 149 So. 205 (1933); Hollywood Cartage Co. v. Wheeling & L. E. Ry., 85 Ohio
App. 182, 88 N.E.2d 278 (1950); Dierks v. Walsh, 203 Okla. 113, 218 P.2d 920
(1950); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 48 (1942).
4. La Fontaine v. The G. M. McAllister, 101 F. Supp. 826 (S.D. N.Y. 1951);
Bosare v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 105 CA-. App.2d 834, 234 P.2d 296 (1951); Wolfson
v. Rubin, 52 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1951); Adams v. Pearson, 411 I1l. 431, 104 N.E.2d 267
(1952); Noel v. Noel, 307 Ky. 132, 210 S.V.2d 142 (1947); Sedam v. Sedam, 83 Ohio
App. 138, 78 N.E.2d 914 (1948).
5. Bimbaum v. Hall, 101 F. Supp. 605 (E.D.S.C. 1951); Gordon v. Gordon, 59
So.2d 40 (Va. 1952); Bagwell v. Bagwell, 153 Fla. 471, 14 So.2d 841 (1943); Pral v.
Prall, 58 Fla. 496, 50 So. 867 (1909); Charles E. Harding Co. v. Harding, 352 Ill. 417,
186 N.E. 152 (1933); Lebrun v. Marcey, 86 A.2d 512 (Md. 1952); RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
6. Davis v. Brown, 94 U.S. 423 (1877); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351
(1876); Birnbaum v. Hall, 101 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. S.C. 1951); Sanders v. Nieman, 17
Cal.2d 563, 110 P.2d 1025 (1941); Gray v. Gray, 91 Fla. 103, 107 So. 261 (1926);
Hewett Grocery Co. v. Biddle Purchasing Co., 289 Mich. 225, 286 N.W. 221 (1939);
Fox v. Employer's Liability Corp., 239 App. Div. 271, 268 N.Y. Supp. 536 (4th Dept.
1934).
CASES NOTED
The test used in determining whether or not the causes of action are
the same for the purpose of ascertaining whether res judicata is applicable,
is the identity of facts essential to the maintenance of the action, 7 or
whether the same evidence would sustain both.8 If there is any uncertainty
as to the matter formerly adjudicated, the party claiming the benfit of the
former judgment has the burden of showing it with sufficient certainty. 9
This may be done by introducing the record of the previous proceedings
or by extrinsic evidence. 10 These principles are applicable in cases where
a party sues for divorce in one state subsequent to his having been denied
a divorce in a sister state. Since the statutes of the various states are vastly
different, the second suit is rarely based on a statute identical in terms
with that involved in the former action, and the test used in determining
whether the causes of action are the same is the identity of facts necessary
for the granting of a divorce under the pertinent statute.11
The recent Florida case of Cordon v. Gordon 2 held that in determining
whether or not full faith and credit will be given the decree of a sister
state denying a divorce, res judicata will not apply unless the issues in both
actions are essentially the same,la nor will it apply if a greater degree of
proof is required in the second action.1' The Gordon case further held
that estoppel by judgment will apply only if it be shown that the precise
facts have been determined in the prior action,1 the term "precise facts"
being construed by the court to mean that "every point and question" must
be shown to have been litigated in the first action. 16
The instant case recognizes the proper test to be applied, and it also
is in accord with the weight of authority on the problem of whether an
action under a state statute should bar an action in another state under
a similar statute. Using an analytical approach, it is difficult to say that
7. Pierce v. National Bank of Commerce, 268 F. 487 (8th Cir. 1920); Iackson v.
Bullock, 62 Fla. 507, 57 So. 617 (1926); Templeton v. Scudder, 19 N.J. Super. 576, 85
A.2d 292 (1951); Canin v. Kesse, 20 N.J. Misc. 371, 28 A.Zd 68 (Dist. Ct. 1942).
8. Hoofnagle v. Alden, 172 Minn. 290, 215 N.W. 211 (1927); Lipkind v. Ward,
256 App. Div. 74, 8 N.Y.S.2d 832 (3d Dept. 1939); Weinstein v. Blanchard, 9 N.J.
Misc. 361, 152 Atl. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Lyons v. Garnette, 88 Ohio App. 543, 98
N.E.2d 346 (1950); Cutler v. Jennings, 99 Vt. 85, 130 Aft. 583 (1925).
9. American Trust Co. v. Butler, 47 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1931); Coleman v. Cole-
man, 157 Fla. 515, 26 So.2d 445 (1946); Rosenbury v. Peter, 269 Mass. 32, 168 N.E.
166 (1929); West v. Imbrie, 127 Misc. 624, 216 N.Y.Supp. 337 (Sip. Ct. 1926); Howe
v. Farmer's and Merchant's Bank, 129 Okla. 232, 264 Pac. 210 (1928).
10. Syms v. McRitchie, 187 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1951); Fryberger v. Consolidated
Electric and Gas Co., 22 Del. Cb. 357, 7 A.2d 211 (1939); Coleman v. Coleman, 157
Fla. 515, 26 So.2d 445 (1946); Sullivan v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 14 N.J. Misc.
890, 190 At]. 72 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
11. Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1952); Bagwell v. Bagwell, 153 Fla. 471,
14 So.2d 841 (1943); Pearson v. Pearson, 230 N.Y. 141, 129 N.E. 349 (1920).
12. 59 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1952).
13. Id. at 44 (Fla. 1952).
14. Ibid.
15. Id. at 45.
16. Ibid.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
two distinct state statutes, differently worded and construed, can be thought
of as the same cause of action.
It is submitted that although the instant case reaches the proper
result, it is but the product of a group of cases which have drawn many
fine and sometimes inaccurate distinctions between res judicata and cstoppel
by judgment. The confusion resulting might be avoided by emphasis in
court decisions on the basic premise that res judicata bars another action
while estoppel by judgment precludes relitigation of facts.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - USE OF TAXING POWER BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN CONFLICT WITH
STATES' POLICE POWERS
Plaintiff filed an information against the defendant for failing to register
and pay the "gamblers occupational tax".' Held, the act is unconstitutional
because the requirements of registration usurped the police powers of the
states. United States v. Kahriger, 105 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
There can be no doubt about the federal government's extensive power
to tax. Equally certain is it that the police powers are exclusive with the
states. Doubts, if any, exist only where Congress, through taxation legisla-
tion, intentionally or unintentionally infringes upon the police powers re-
served to the states.
Several times, from the early 19th century to date, the Supreme Court
of the United States has reiterated the principle that the federal government
cannot accomplish by means of the taxing power that which it otherwise
cannot do.2 More often, however, it has chosen to rely on the principle that
if Congress has passed a revenue measure, the Court will not look to the
motives behind the passing of the tax legislation.3  In a fairly recent case
involving the "Marijuana Tax" the following language appears: "It is be-
yond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. Nor
does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on activities which Con-
gress might not otherwise regulate."4
To support its view, the court in the instant case relied on United States
v. Constantine.5 Quoting at length from the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts,
the court concludes that it is immaterial that the tax, by itself, could be a valid
one. With apparent misgivings and with consideration given to present
1. 65 STAT. 529, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3290, 3291 (1951).
2. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
3. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); Nigro v. United States,
276 U.S. 332 (1928); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919); McCray v. United
States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
4. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950).
5. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
